William D. Kickham
William D. Kickham
William D. Kickham
William D. Kickham
Justia Badge
Massachusetts Bar Association Badge
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys Badge
The National Trial Lawyers Badge
American Institute of Personal Injury Attorney Badge
Super Lawyers
Avvo Raiting 10.0 - Top attorney

As the Boston Globe has reported, recent high-profile accidents in the Boston area caused by elderly drivers, has raised a lot of discussion about the subject of elderly drivers in this state. Seven people were recently injured in Plymouth after a car driven by a 73-year-old woman jumped a curb and ran into a crowd gathered at a war memorial. It was the woman’s third accident since turning 70, authorities said. In Danvers, a 93-year-old man recently drove his car into the entrance of a Wal-Mart, injuring six people, after he mistook the gas pedal for the brake. These incidents have caused a lot of people to re-think the idea that elderly drivers have a right to drive ‘just like anybody else.’

In my view as a Massachusetts criminal defense attorney as well as a Massachusetts personal injury attorney, that idea is plainly ridiculous. Simple deductive reasoning can expose this, if more people took the time to actually think about a problem as serious as this, before spouting out unfounded and unjustified opinions. Try to defeat this reasoning: Every state in the United States, including Massachusetts, legislates that persons under a certain age – usually but not always age 16 – are unqualified to operate a motor vehicle. Unqualified in what respect? According to almost all states, persons under age 16 lack the mental, emotional and developmental skills necessary to operate two tons of glass and steel on the public roads. Wisely and logically, we require that such persons be of a certain age or older before they can apply for a driver’s license and operate a motor vehicle on the public roads. That makes sense; it always has.

Yet on the extreme other end of the spectrum – when persons have reached an age that I think all reasonable people could logically conclude disqualifies them from operating a motor vehicle – we dare not say so. Why? Two reasons: 1) Because senior citizens have the right to vote – minors do not. (Hence, legislators in any state don’t care what minors think, but pay scientifically close attention to what elderly voters think. And 2) The numbers of those elderly voters are growing every day. The U.S. Census Bureau projects there will be 9.6 million people aged 85 and older by 2030, up 73% from today. Don’t think every elected state legislator and governor doesn’t have those numbers emblazoned in their minds.

In my previous post on this topic, I noted that the Massachusetts Appeals Court has recently handed down a decision that changes the way the state Sex Offender Registration Board (SORB,) determines whether or not someone previously convicted of a sex offense, must continue to register as a sex offender indefinitely in Massachusetts.

Now, to the legal reasons why: The Appeals Court ruled the way it did here, based largely upon two legal concepts: “Retroactivity,” and “Due Process.” Of these two concepts, most people are more familiar with due process. This legal maxim, embedded in the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Constitution, requires (very basically and broadly) that anyone subjected to a criminal proceeding be given notice and an opportunity to be heard as to the charges or proceedings against them. “Retroactivity” refers to the process of punishing someone in the present, based upon an unsupported inference or assumption that the person still poses a threat that the legal proceeding seeks to protect against. Retroactivity played a key role in the Appeals Court’s decision here, as the appellant’s offense, which SORB argued made him subject to its continuing registration requirement, was a single offense that took place almost 25 years ago. More important than that, there was compelling evidence that the incident was fueled by a drinking problem that has not existed for many years since the time of the offense, and there was strong evidence that appellant had reformed his life in many respects since that time.

In this case, the hearing officer at SORB found that Doe presented a “low” risk to reoffend and a “low” degree of danger to the public. Resultantly, she classified him as a level one sex offender (the least serious level) but notwithstanding, the finding subjected him to the continuing registration requirement as a sex offender. The court noted that in so finding, it could be argued that the hearing examiner based her reasoning on the fact that Doe had not shown that he presented “no” risk of re-offense or threat to the community. But the court found that this “inferential leap,” was not sustainable here where: a) such a finding was legally foreclosed by the sex offender registration statute; b) the record did not show that the hearing examiner considered the issue of his present risk level; and c) the hearing examiner, at the time she made her ruling, did not have the benefit of a prior Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) ruling preventing such inferential conclusions.

Sex offenses in Massachusetts, or anywhere, elicit a strong reaction on the part of the public and the media – and understandably so. This is especially true when the offenses involve children or the vulnerable – again, with good reason. Wisely, we in Massachusetts (and other states also) have enacted laws requiring persons convicted of sex offenses to publicly register as sex offenders with a special agency that monitors such convicts, following their conviction and/or release from prison. But how far should the law go when dealing with someone who has been convicted of a single sex offense, which involved substance abuse, many years ago,? Should that person be required to register publicly as a sex offender indefinitely, for so long as he or she remains a resident of Massachusetts?

The Massachusetts Appeals Court handed down an interesting decision this past week, dealing with the requirement that sex offenders in Massachusetts must register potentially for life as such, with the state Sex Offender Registration Board (SORB.) SORB is the state agency that is charged with registering and monitoring persons either convicted of, or who have accepted guilty pleas on, sexual offenses. To date, if a defendant in a criminal prosecution either pled guilty to or was convicted of a sex crime, he or she would be required to register with SORB indefinitely – no matter what circumstances surrounded the original crime, or how old the offense was. The Massachusetts Appeals Court has now modified that requirement.

In John DOE, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 24341 vs. SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD, the Appeals Court heard the case of “Doe” (a pseudonym,) who claimed that he was wrongly being required to continue to register with SORB as a sex offender, based upon a single offense 25 years ago, which he claimed was fueled by a drinking problem that he no longer has. The appellant was convicted in 1984 of assault with intent to rape, after leaving a Quincy bar. Since his conviction 25 years ago, “Doe” had enrolled in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA,) given up drinking, led a responsible life and had experienced no trouble with law enforcement or been involved in criminal offenses of any kind. A hearing officer at SORB concluded that though Doe posed a “low” risk, he still posed a risk, that the details of his personal rehabilitation were not material, and that he therefore was still required to register as a Level One sex offender (the least serious level classification within SORB.) Doe appealed to a Superior Court judge, who affirmed SORB’s findings. Doe’s attorney then brought the matter to the Appeals Court for review.

According to internet safety experts and many public policy officials, teens increasingly face the possibility of becoming registered sex offenders for sending sexually explicit images of themselves (or others) over the Internet and their cell phones. More and more schools and parents have discovered that their teenage sons and daughters have emailed sexually suggestive photos of themselves to other classmates, usually through their cell phone cameras. Remember the Polaroid Land Camera? And you thought that was high-tech …

To combat what many perceive to be a growing problem here, some prosecutors across the country have suggested that emailing such images (by underage teens of themselves or others,) could constitute dissemination of illegal “kiddie porn.” While dissemination of nude and semi-nude images of persons over 18 is legal, such images of anyone under 18 are considered illegal pornography in almost all states. Dissemination of these images over the internet, via ‘sexting,’ might constitute a federal crime. Most sexting involves girls who intend to send the photo to a boyfriend or someone they are interested in. It used to be that if a high school kid were interested in another student, she or he would try to get into a study group with that student, or strike up a conversation. Not so any more. If these pictures stayed with the intended recipient and strayed no further, perhaps there wouldn’t result any real problems.

But of course, that’s not what happens. The “innocent” photo soon enough is forwarded to friends, and friend of friends, and faster that you can say “swine flu,” it spreads like a virus, and the whole school (if not half the town) has seen the images. Clearly, this is a bad idea and a foolish practice. Before she or he knows it, aside from being the talk of the school, the person who took the photo of him or herself, is the target of cyber-bullying, with threats made by enemies or extortionists to post the images on YouTube and the internet. A California-based nonprofit agency, i-SAFE, which provides an online safety curriculum for students in Grades K-12, recently coordinated “Cyber Safety Week” across various schools in Massachusetts, to warn of these dangers, and this is a good first response to this problem. The Verizon Foundation donated $100,000 for the training sessions. At the Greater New Bedford Vocational School where one such program was held recently, Bristol County Sheriff Thomas M. Hodgson commented, “This is a whole new crime prevention program for a threat facing our children and our parents.” Hodgson’s department has been sponsoring an Internet safety campaign for the last two years.

In my previous post on this story, I said I’d explain more what the insanity defense is and isn’t. Aside from the possibility that this defendant may have committed two murders over 23 years ago and had been walking around scott-free until this parental kidnapping charge, this whole story doesn’t merit an asterisk in a conversation.

That being said, Gehartstreiter’s (or, as he’s been referred to elsewhere, “Whateverhisname’s”) defense lawyers are going to have one hell of a hard time convincing a jury that this defendant was legally insane to the point where he should be acquitted of this charge. The reason for this is that, in order for a jury in Massachusetts to find a defendant “not guilty by reason of insanity”, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not just mentally unstable, but so mentally ill that he or she could not comprehend or understand the criminality of his conduct, or comprehend the difference between (legally) right and wrong. As a Massachusetts criminal defense lawyer, I don’t doubt that Gehartstreiter’s lawyers can demonstrate the Gehartstreiter suffers from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, or that he harbors delusions of grandiosity. The defense’s psychological experts can make that clear fairly easily (as could reportedly almost anyone who has spent ten minutes with this defendant.)

But insane to the point of not recognizing or understanding the criminality of his conduct in crafting an elaborate plan to abscond illegally with his daughter, assaulting his daughter’s social worker, then crossing multiple state lines in an attempt to avoid capture? A single juror’s simple question: If he were so insane that he didn’t comprehend the criminality if his conduct, why the elaborate escape plan to run and hide?

I thought awhile about posting something on the Clark Rockefeller trial here in Boston. (I posted previously about this case, and recently considered that perhaps I should omit further attention to it.) Part of me says that this is an overblown, media-driven case that is no different from dozens of other similar cases of “parental kidnapping” and criminal defense. But then, such could be said of almost any case or trial reported in the media: Few of them are dramatically different than the vast majority of similar criminal cases that run through the courts every day. What makes a case a “media case?” Pick one: a) Celebrity; b) Upper-Class murders and sex crimes or violent crimes (something too many people falsely think is antithetical); c) Sex; d) Con-artists and “The Con”; d) Graphic brutality; e) Sex; f) Sex; g) Sex, and so on.

Judging from the majority of posted comments to the Boston Globe’s website (which has been covering the story extensively, and has published over 100 reader posts on this subject on its website to date,) the Globe’s readership seems to feel that this case is, to quote Shakespeare, “Much Ado About Nothing.” Here is a sample of recently posted reader comments to the Globe:

“I don’t get why this case grabs headlines. Whateverhisnameis got a raw deal from divorce court and wanted more time with his daughter. He’s got plenty of company with the thousands of other men in Massachusetts who get the short end of every divorce in this state. But if he didn’t have a funky name that he changed, as many legal immigrants to this country do, this would be just another domestic case resulting from a bad probate court decision. Let Whateverhisnameis off with the crazy defense and focus on the real problem, men all over the Commonwealth suffering from one-sided legal decisions.” Posted by Andrew Palmer May 28, 09 08:56 AM • “No one cares about this story. Once the girl was returned safe, that was it. Enough of this loser.” Posted by CB May 28, 09 09:01 AM • “I think Single Dad has missed the point. As a father I can tell you this is not an issue of “fathering.” This is about an evil individual putting his needs above those of his child. This may also be about a profoundly dangerous individual continuing his pattern of anti-social behavior…” Posted by Lorne D. Gilsig May 28, 09 09:35 AM

In my previous post on this subject, I discussed the recent Supreme Judicial Court ruling that persons found to be in illegal possession of a firearm in Massachusetts can no longer be held in jail prior to trial, based on the grounds that such persons present a danger to the public. This ruling has caused a lot of controversy in the legal community, and justifiably so. Very predictably, the opinions on the ruling run straight down the liberal-conservative divide: The “get tough on crime” conservatives feel (with a fair amount of good reasons) that anyone who illegally carries a gun is almost certain to be a violent criminal (commonly gang members,) and that violent criminals should locked up so that the rest of us are made more safe. The liberal bloc, often characterized as “soft on crime,” feel that law enforcement and the courts shouldn’t’ wield this kind of power to lock someone up so easily without that person first committing any violent crime. (Liberals are also often characterized as advocating that criminals should be rehabilitated, not incarcerated. Depending on the nature of the crime(s) involved, this is often a very valid and sound argument.)

So who’s right? Is this ruling by the SJC good for the residents of Massachusetts, or not?

Think about it: The conservative view has its logic: If someone is carrying a concealed and unlicensed weapon, they’re almost certain to be a dangerous criminal, and it is a logical and reasonable conclusion that such persons present a danger to the public — the very type of “dangerousness” that this statute contemplates. But what about the liberal view? If someone bought a firearm solely for the purpose of self-protection and not for the purpose of committing any crime, and then for some reason neglected to secure a Firearms ID Card (otherwise known as an “FID Card”,) and a police officer discovered it, should that person be locked up in jail prior to trial? Before answering, consider: Under Massachusetts law, mace and pepper spray are considered “firearms”. If the SJC had delivered an opposite ruling in this case, and a law-abiding person were to carry pepper spray solely for self-protection (against the risk of sexual assault, murder, or other violent crimes,) and were found by police during a traffic stop to not possess a valid FID card, that person could be thrown in jail, without bail — without first committing any violent crime. Is that fair or just?

In a classic liberal-conservative split, a recent Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) ruling has held that persons who are found to be in illegal possession of a gun or firearm cannot be held in jail pending trial. The ruling is important because many such defendants have been held pending trial, under a state law passed in the 1990’s that was designed to curb domestic (i.e., family) violence. That law, known as the “Dangerousness Statute” was initially enacted as a way to cut down on domestic violence by giving prosecutors and judges the power to hold someone who had only a minor criminal record, but was considered a threat to a spouse or significant other.

After its passage, some District Attorneys’ offices in Massachusetts began to use the Dangerousness Statute to argue that illegal possession of a gun or firearm constituted adequate “dangerousness” to the public, to satisfy a motion to hold the gun violator in jail pending trial. Some District Attorney’s offices saw in the statute, a new tool to rid the streets of violent offenders who are found by police to be carrying a gun illegally. (It will surprise no one that, typically, violent offenders do not carry firearms licenses, or “FID Cards”.) In a 4-to-1 ruling earlier this week, the SJC ruled that gun possession violators can no longer be held in jail under this statute, while awaiting trial. In an extremely controversial decision, the court ruled that illegal gun possession is a “passive and victimless crime.” The court ruled that persons charged with possessing illicit firearms can no longer be held without bail (under this particular statute) as a “danger to society.” (Note to the Justice Spina: While perhaps technically accurate, using the words “passive and victimless crime” to describe the carrying and concealment of an illegal gun, is not exactly the wisest of grammatical choices. And I say this as a Massachusetts criminal defense attorney.)

While several District Attorneys’ offices had used the statute for holding such defendants without bail, it was the office of Bristol County District Attorney C. Samuel Sutter which used it the most. He did so as part of his get-tough law enforcement strategy to cut down on gun violence, by seeking pretrial detention for every person charged with illegal gun possession in his jurisdiction, which includes the high-crime area of New Bedford. His office used it as standard procedure in all illegal firearms arrests, and since taking office, Sutter has sought 269 gun detention cases and prevailed in 163 of them. The case went to the high court after a lower court refused Sutter’s request to hold several suspects on gun charges without bail for 90 days, and Sutter appealed to the SJC. In practical terms, the high court in this case was acting to end confusion among judges: In Bristol County, a Superior Court judge refused to apply the law to one defendant found to be illegally carrying a gun, while a Taunton District Court judge concluded the statute did apply to another defendant charged with the same crime.

The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) handed down a very interesting ruling recently, that will widely impact how suspects who are accused of sex crimes can be monitored when they are on release pending trial. The court recently ruled that suspected sex offenders cannot be ordered by a judge to wear a GPS tracking bracelet while they are awaiting trial. The ruling is important because previously, the Commonwealth could file and argue a motion before a judge at a defendant’s arraignbment, requesting that a suspect released before trial be ordered to wear a GPS tracking bracelet, so that police and authorities could monitor his/her whereabouts prior to trial. A law passed in 2006 specifically allowed this motion, and it has been used in many pre-trial cases involving sex crimes since then. However, the SJC recently ruled that the law was intended by the Massachusetts Legislature to apply only to convicts who have been placed on probation after being convicted of certain sex crimes, not to those who are merely suspects. The GPS law was challenged by a man who had been placed on pretrial probation by a New Bedford District Court judge after he was charged with indecent assault and battery on a child under 14 as well as disseminating obscene matter to a minor.

A lot of people, especially advocates for victims of sex crimes, are understandably upset by this ruling. It is not uncommon for someone accused of a sex crime to be released on pre-trial probation, and without any means to monitor such a suspect, he or she is effectively released back into the community, where they may possibly re-offend. On the other hand, a person can be innocent of a crime they are accused of. Not everyone charged with a crime is guilty of that crime; people are often accused unjustly. In such a situation, it can be humiliating and onerous to be forced to wear a GPS tracking bracelet, 24/7. It is effectively a “Scarlet Letter”. This can be a tough issue. I’d like to know what my readers think about this issue. Email me at: bill@kickhamlegal.com, and let me know your thoughts.

In my previous post on this subject, I discussed how circumstantial evidence obtained by police can still be used to charge a suspect with murder, even though there are no direct eyewitnesses to the killing. But why is the charge “murder” here, and not something lesser? Technically, Markoff is being charged with a violation of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 265, Section1, which defines the crime as follows: “Murder committed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought, or with extreme atrocity or cruelty, or in the commission or attempted commission of a crime punishable with death or imprisonment for life, is murder in the first degree.”

Do police investigators and the Suffolk County District Attorney’s office believe that this was a pre-meditated murder (such as with the recent Massachusetts case convicting Neil Entwistle? Not likely.

Instead, Markoff is being charged with murder almost certainly because of what is known as the “Felony Murder Rule”. This legal maxim provides that a charge of murder will apply if a death occurs during the commission of a felony (think of a bank robbery.) When this happens, the homicide can be considered first degree murder, without establishing intent to kill. This rule “injects” the malice element required for first degree murder, from the act of committing the felony. For the felony-murder rule to apply, the prosecution is required to first establish the required elements of the alleged underlying felony, and the death must have resulted from the “natural and probable consequence of the felony.” Again, the prosecution doesn’t have to prove intent to kill; only that a death resulted during the felony, or during the attempt to commit the felony. Here, Markoff was allegedly in the act of kidnapping and robbery of the victim when the death occurred, hence the charge of murder. I’m told by persons close to the investigation that so far, prosecutors do not believe that Markoff intended to kill the victim, but that the shooting and death resulted when the victim resisted the robbery.

Contact Information