William D. Kickham
William D. Kickham
William D. Kickham
William D. Kickham
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On Oct. 17 2010, police officers in the town of Mount Pleasant, New York, shot and killed Easton resident Danroy “DJ” Henry, age 20, outside a bar at a shopping center in that town, not far from New York City. Henry was at the bar with friends, after attending a football game between Pace University (where he attended college,) and Stonehill College. Police alleged that officers shot Henry after he struck police officers with his car. Other witnesses disputed this account, saying that Henry was only moving his car at the request of police, when they suddenly jumped on the hood of the car and shot him through the windshield. Immediately Henry’s death, his family disputed the police Department version of events, and called for an immediate investigation.

The mother of one of Henry’s friends who was in the car and who was also shot and wounded in the incident, disputed the police account in an interview with CNN shortly after the shooting. Donna Parks said that Henry and others in the car were waiting for a friend to come out of the establishment “when a police officer banged … on the window.” In response, she said that Henry began driving after her son, Brandon Cox, told Henry that he thought police wanted him to move his car. “Another police officer with his gun drawn just ran out in front of DJ’s car,” as he was moving it, said Parks, who insisted that Henry had no time to stop. Parks has also told CNN that after police shot Henry multiple times, they “pulled him out of the car, handcuffed him, put him face down on the ground and left him there for 15 to 20 minutes.”

Amidst calls for an investigation, shortly after Henry’s death, the Westchester, New York District Attorney’s Office commenced a grand jury inquiry of the incident. Yesterday, that office announced that, “after due deliberation on the evidence presented in this matter, the grand jury found that there was no reasonable cause to vote an indictment.”

Just last week, I criticized Gov. Deval Patrick for his proposal to change the way public defenders are provided for indigent criminal defendants. Today, I want to do just the opposite: Commend him for another of his proposals dealing with criminal law.

Specifically, Gov. Patrick should be lauded for his legislative initiative to repeal the current law in Massachusetts that requires mandatory minimum jail and state prison sentences for anyone convicted of “dealing” drugs in a “school zone.” I’ve blogged and spoken previously on the foolishness of mandatory minimum sentencing, which almost always results from a Legislature pressured to act on largely misdirected public anger following high-profile crimes. Several years ago, that public pressure descended on the Legislature primarily due to inner city frustrations over the problem of drug dealing in urban areas; specifically, from parents’ fears that drug dealers were actively targeting young school children to sell drugs to. The result? The Massachusetts Legislature passed a law that required mandatory minimum jail sentences for anyone convicted of any kind of an offense involving a controlled substance or otherwise illegal drug.

Care to know just how harsh and unjust this law is? If anyone is convicted – whether following a trial or if a defendant otherwise enters a pre-trial plea equating to a “conviction” – of a drug offense occurring within 1000 feet of a school, that person is automatically sentenced to anywhere from two to 15 years behind bars. If the term is 2 ½ years or less, the sentence can be served at a county House of Correction; If it is more than 2 ½ years, the sentence must be completed at a State Prison – and that is extremely severe. I don’t think anyone – least of all a clueless Legislature not known for its collective intelligence – realizes just how great a distance 1000 feet really is. Let me put it in sports terms: Would you think that a football field is a long distance? It’s 300 feet. 1000 feet is over three football fields in length. The idea behind this law was, supposedly, to prevent drug dealers from targeting children in (largely urban) schoolyards and school grounds. Instead, it has done two things: 1) Created a foolishly large, expansive distance to measure an alleged drug crime from in relation to any school, and 2) Included in that law, any drug transaction deemed illegal, no matter how minor.

I have a very interesting case development to report today in the area of drunk driving in Massachusetts. As a Dedham, Massachusetts OUI/DWI defense lawyer, I’m often asked “What happens if a person is found by a police officer to be drunk and sitting in the driver’s seat of a car, but the car is parked and the engine is turned off? Can you be charged with drunk driving in Massachusetts under those circumstances?”

I’ll get to this in a moment, but first, it’s important to understand that a person can always be charged with OUI/DWI – or with any crime: Whether those charges will stand up in court, is an entirely different question, and that’s why you should always have an experienced and talented OUI defense attorney represent you if you’re ever charged with this crime.

Now, to answer the question: Prior to this past week, the correct legal answer to this question was always as follows: If the engine was not running, then the “Operation” element of the charge could not be sustained, and hence the case would almost certainly have to be dismissed. That is, one of the requisite elements of this crime, articulated in Massachusetts General Laws. Chapter 90 Sec. 24, is that the defendant must have been “Operating” the vehicle at the time he was arrested. “Operation” always meant a number of different things under both statutory and case law, but central to the prosecution satisfying that element, was that the driver’s key had to be in the ignition, in the “Engine On” position, and the engine had to be running. Hence, if a police officer found someone parked on the side of a public way and suspected the driver was operating under the influence of alcohol or other drugs, and the driver’s key was in the ignition but the engine was not running, then that person could not be convicted of OUI/DWI, because the statutory requirement of “Operating” the vehicle would not have been satisfied. As long as the engine was not engaged or running, a defendant could not be successfully convicted of OUI/DWI.

Gov. Deval Patrick likes to fashion himself as a typical “man-of-the people” Democrat. Except that he’s anything but that, and knows very little about the everyday workings of the “average person” on the street. That should come as no surprise to anyone, given that he’s a multimillionaire who made his money in the corporate world, but his latest legislative proposal concerning legal practice only underscores his cluelessness about real world economics, and the way state government really, actually works.

Patrick’s latest proposal revolves around how indigent criminal defendants are provided legal counsel in Massachusetts. As anyone who’s ever heard of the Miranda Rights knows that if a person is charged with a crime in any state in the United States, and cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for him or her free of charge. Different states fulfill this federal requirement in different ways. In Massachusetts, for decades now, defense lawyers for indigent criminal defendants have been provided almost completely by a network of private attorneys, who are contracted with the state to provide these services. The agency that administers this program is called the Massachusetts Committee for Public Counsel Services (“CPCS”,) and operates under the Massachusetts Judicial Branch.

These attorneys, known as “Bar Advocates”, must first complete appropriate CPCS training and certification requirements before they can become eligible to represent indigent criminal defendants. It is Bar Advocates who defend 90% of indigent defense cases in courtrooms across the state, from Pittsfield to Provincetown; Methuen to Martha’s Vineyard. The other 10% of these cases, the vast minority, are handled by lawyers who are full-time state employees, complete with annual salary and benefits. Private duty Bar advocates are paid anywhere from $50 to $65 per hour, to defend people charged with a variety of crimes, 99% of which can land them in jail for anywhere from a day to life. However, court-appointed attorneys also represent indigent clients in extremely important non-criminal cases, such as representing families that are involved with the Department of Social Services, and people who are at risk of civil commitment and forced medication.

The Supreme Judicial Court ruled this week that foreign nationals, including illegal aliens, must be provided with the opportunity to be in contact with diplomats from their home country when facing criminal charges in Massachusetts. The court ruled that the right is guaranteed by the Vienna Convention, which is an international treaty adopted by the United States in 1969.

More so, the SJC also ruled that foreign nationals who are convicted of a Massachusetts crime will be allowed to seek a new trial if they can satisfy two tests: 1) That they were not informed about this right; and 2) That the lack of this information played a role in their conviction. At least one prosecutor reacted to the decision by saying that it has the potential to unleash a flood of costly litigation. Essex County District Attorney Jonathan W. Blodgett commented that “There is no limit to this, we will be flooded with motions for a new trial.” Blodgett asserted that even though the Vienna Convention is a treaty between sovereign nations, the SJC has made a foreign treaty part of the fabric of individual rights in Massachusetts. Blodgett plans to file legislation asking the Massachusetts Legislature to reverse this decision. On the opposing side, immigration lawyers and criminal defense lawyers say the court’s ruling merely reinforces rules that have already been on the books in Massachusetts for many years.

The unanimous 7-to-0 ruling noted that even though the United States had ratified the Vienna Convention in 1969, the International Court of Justice in The Hague ruled in 2009 that the United States had not complied with the Convention’s rules on diplomatic contact when dealing with Mexican nationals. Justice Robert Cordy wrote that Massachusetts will now take steps to bring the state into compliance with that treaty: “In order to enable the full effect to be given to [the Vienna Convention], we conclude that the notifications it requires must be incorporated into the protocols of the state and local law enforcement agencies of Massachusetts.”

Last Friday, a Hampden County Superior Court jury returned a verdict that a lot of people on either side of the gun control debate had been watching closely.

Called informally the “Uzi Death Case,” the former Chief of the Pelham, Massachusetts Police Department, Edward Fleury, was charged with involuntary manslaughter and multiple counts of Massachusetts firearms violations in the October 2008 death of an 8 year-old boy, Christopher Bizilj of Ashford, Connecticut. The young boy was attending a gun fair that was held at the Westfield Sportsman’s Club in Westfield, Massachusetts. While the gun fair was held on the grounds of the Westfield Sportsman’s Club, the event was organized by a company that Edward Fleury owned and operated. While attending the fair with his father, Dr. Charles Bizilj, the young boy lost control of an Uzi submachine gun he was holding, and shot himself in the head in front of shocked onlookers. Those onlookers included the boy’s father and his brother. Prosecutors alleged that Fleury was criminally reckless by allowing children to illegally shoot loaded machine guns, while being “supervised” by a firing range “officer” who was 15 years old at the time, and who possessed neither proper licensing nor firearms training.

Sounds pretty bad, but Fleury’s defense lawyer had some powerful facts to argue to this jury: 1) Principally, the boy’s father, (Dr. Charles Bizilj) had signed a waiver at the fair, acknowledging the risks (including death) involved in letting his son shoot a loaded gun; and 2) The fact that the event had been held for several years previous to this accident, without any problems. Legally, what these two facts did, was seriously damage (if not altogether destroy) the Hampden County District Attorney’s argument that Fleury was “criminally reckless”, a core of the Commonwealth’s charges against him. These facts also undercut prosecutors’ counts of illegally furnishing a machine gun to a minor. Had the above two facts not been present, Fleury may well have been convicted on these charges. If he were, he would have faced combined sentences of up to 50 years in state prison.

Understandably, the members of the Massachusetts Parole Board are on the receiving end of a lot of anger, even rage, in the wake of the December 26 2010 murder of Woburn police officer John B. Maguire by a freed convict.

By all official accounts, investigators say Domenic Cinelli fatally shot John Maquire during a robbery attempt. Those same officials describe Cinelli as a career criminal, who never should have been released by the Parole Board. Police chiefs from across Massachusetts, together with several state senators, ratcheted up the pressure on the state Parole Board yesterday, to both account for their November 2008 decision to release the career criminal who murdered Maguire, Domenic Cinelli, as well as call a halt to all parole hearings until a formal investigation reveals why and how Cinelli was released. About 75 police chiefs and several state senators – interestingly, from both sides of the aisle, joined in loudly condemning the Board’s actions in releasing Cinelli, and in calling for a halt to all future release hearings until the official investigation ordered by Governor Deval Patrick is completed.

These reactions from both the general public, public safety officials and elected politicians, is very, very understandable. I say this as someone who makes his living, in part, as a Boston criminal defense lawyer. Who can blame anyone for feeling this way?

The conviction of a Massachusetts murder defendant was recently overturned by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, for a rather interesting reason. That reason centered on a suspect’s constitutional right to counsel while in police custody.

The defendant, Jerome McNulty, was arrested by Salem police on the morning of March 29 2001, for the murder of his girlfriend. The time line of what followed was key to the SJC’s decision to overturn the conviction: Upon McNulty’s arrest, he was read his Miranda Rights. A custodial interrogation was then conducted at approximately 9:12 AM, by a Salem detective and a state police sergeant. The interrogation took a break at approximately 10:00 AM. The defendant had told police when he was arrested that he did not have funds for an attorney, and at approximately 10:27 AM, an attorney was appointed to represent him. That attorney repeatedly called the Salem police station, asking to speak with McNulty, but he was told that the defendant was unavailable. On one occasion when the attorney called the police station back, he was told by a booking officer – the very same booking officer that had booked McNulty – that she could “neither confirm nor deny” the defendant’s presence at the police station. In other phone calls the attorney made to the station in attempting to speak with the defendant, the attorney was told that he’d have to speak with the department’s public information officer, and was transferred only into that officer’s unattended voice mail. In each and all of the attorney’s phone calls to the police station, he repeatedly asked police staff to pass along a specific message to the defendant: Do not say anything to police investigators.

Clearly, the police officers involved were engaged in an orchestrated effort to prevent any messages from the attorney, ultimately getting to the defendant. The defendant ultimately did not receive the attorney’s phone messages until 10:45 AM, and by that time had already signed a statement essentially admitting to the murder. The attorney arrived shortly thereafter, and was prevented from seeing the defendant for an additional 20 minutes while police investigators wrapped up getting the defendant’s signed statements.

In my previous post on this subject, I discussed how the U.S. Supreme Court is currently weighing the constitutionality of a statute passed by the state of California in 2005, to limit the sale of graphically violent, interactive video games to minors under the age of 18.

Once again, the First Amendment is front and center here. This Amendment to our constitution – literally, the first Amendment made to it, allows us all to speak openly against the government, a fundamental right that many nations do not allow their citizenry. There are forms of speech that are not protected by the First Amendment, such as obscenity. Other forms of such “unprotected speech” include speech which creates a “clear and present danger” of imminent illegal action; speech which contains narrowly predefined “fighting words”; written or spoken falsities (libel or slander, which can be punished by civil suit); and speech that is restricted because the government can demonstrate a “narrowly tailored” “compelling state interest”.

So free speech is not absolute, but in my view as a Boston criminal defense lawyer, the meaning of the First Amendment has been distorted in recent years to allow for all manner of violence and savagery to be paraded throughout our nation – under the aegis of “free speech.” The result has been a “quicksand effect”, dragging down a nation that was once admired for its morality and decency, to a country infected with violence, moral perversity and the cultural degradation that accompanies such permissive thinking.

Each October, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS, in the legal community,) hears arguments on cases that it has announced earlier in the year, that it will hear. Last month, it heard oral arguments on a California law that sought to ban the sale or rental of violent video games to teenagers under the age of 18. What happens with this decision, which may be announced next June (2011) will impact the moral direction of this country in ways that most people cannot yet even imagine.

As I wrote this post, I considered where I should publish it: Here on my criminal law blog, or on my Boston Accident Lawyer blog. I decided to publish it here, not only because the issues involve criminal law, but for a more important reason: I consider the gradual erosion of decency, dignity and public morality in this country to be a crime. I also consider it a “crime” (symbolically speaking) that we have a Supreme Court that routinely fails – using liberally expanded interpretations of the First Amendment and definitions of “free speech” – to allow state and local governments to enact laws that will stem the rapidly growing spread of violence and barbarism that infects our nation. I say this as a Boston criminal attorney who believes that the court should always intone the First Amendment to safeguard the individual’s right of free speech against government. I do not believe the First Amendment should be misused to allow any and all kinds of speech, no matter how destructive or dangerous, anywhere, on any subject, in any form, at any time. That is not what the First Amendment was intended to protect, and its perversion has produced devastating social and cultural effects in this country.

This current case before the Court is not a standard, run-of-the-mill case about the First Amendment and “free expression.” Nor, despite its facial appearance, is the case really about “commercial free speech.” Don’t let liberal-leaning reporters and writers fool you that this case is about such high-minded, deep-thinking constitutional principles (though, as with all cases before the Court, this case does involve constitutional issues.) This case is about moral integrity, and human integrity. It is about the protection of minors, whose brains under the age of 18 are not fully developed and medically proven to be vulnerable to the suggestive and pernicious effects of violent imagery. It is about the protection of our country from the rapid and virulent infection of violence that plagues seemingly every corner of our society – from gritty urban streets, to bucolic rural towns in New Hampshire. It is about the protection and promotion of dignity and decency – and of the rapid decline of those once so American of values. In essence, this case is about the frighteningly rapid degradation of morals and the escalation of savagery in this country, accelerated under the aegis of “free speech” and “constitutional principles.” Make no mistake: This case will be a barometer of where this country is headed – sinking into an ever-deepening sewer of moral filth and cultural degradation – or rising once again to be the decent, values-laden country that it once was.

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