William D. Kickham
William D. Kickham
William D. Kickham
William D. Kickham
Justia Badge
Massachusetts Bar Association Badge
Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys Badge
The National Trial Lawyers Badge
American Institute of Personal Injury Attorney Badge
Super Lawyers
Avvo Raiting 10.0 - Top attorney

The Massachusetts Legislature has been busy debating a crime bill that would eliminate any parole eligibility for persons convicted three times of violent felonies. The general concern over allowing violent offenders access to parole has been gaining steam for several years now, but was brought to a head following the 20100 murder of a Woburn police officer by a prison inmate who had been paroled despite a lengthy history of violent offenses.

Predictably, there are two camps in this argument: Law and order advocates, who justifiably want our streets protected from violent prison inmates who have been released early on parole, and civil rights advocates, who argue that prisoners’ legal rights to parole may be eliminated in the rush to pass a strong anti-crime bill. What’s needed here is balance and perspective.

The objective of the bill is to remove parole eligibility for any inmates who have been convicted of three or more violent felonies, such as murder, or rape. That’s the very type of paroled inmate who murdered the Woburn police officer in 2010. That inmate should not have been released, and the overall approach makes common sense. But something often goes wrong between common sense and final outcomes,at least when it comes to our Legislature. As of right now, the current version of this bill would apply to almost 60 different felonies, including some that don’t typically involve violence, such as drug offenses. For example, in the current House version of the bill, a person convicted and sentenced twice for drug distribution could receive a life sentence after he or she is convicted on a third offense for, say, unarmed robbery.

It is said that “Actions speak louder than words.” The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed that very powerfully in the area of Massachusetts arrests last week, as it ruled that a person shaking his head horizontally left to right, indicating “no”, is just as powerful and effective as the spoken word when it comes to invoking the constitutional right to remain silent. This right, of course, is familiar to anyone with a television set, and is among several rights encoded in the famous Miranda Rights.

The case stems from an October 2008 arrest of a man suspected of indecent assault and battery on the Boston subway system. The suspect made incriminating statements after he had been asked by police officers for the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (a/k/a the “T”,) if he wished to continue speaking with them, and he had shaken his head back and forth. Specifically, at the start of the interrogation, officers gave the suspect a typical “waiver form” advising the suspect of his right to remain silent and his right to have a lawyer present during questioning. Before the suspect had finished signing the form, an officer asked the suspect if he wished to discuss what he was being charged with. In response, the suspect asked what would happen if he didn’t speak to police. When the officer told him “nothing,” the suspect asked that he be allowed to go home. Clarifying, the officer then asked him, “So you don’t want to speak?” At that point, the suspect shook his head back and forth.

At trial, the man’s attorney later filed what is called a Motion To Suppress, arguing that his client’s incriminating statements to police should be ruled inadmissible at his trial. The SJC reviewed the case, and agreed with the defendant. This ruling is unusual, because until now in Massachusetts, the legal standard applied to determine whether or not a suspect has validly invoked his right to remain silent, has been the long-held federal standard. That standard requires that a suspect declare his right not to speak with police “with the utmost clarity.” However, the SJC ruled that a person arrested in Massachusetts has greater rights under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights than provided under federal law on this subject.

First, let me say that there hasn’t been a post here in a while, and I’m sorry about that. December saw me distracted with an extremely busy combination of court appearances, trials, and a vacation beginning December 20 – all of which caused me to be extremely busy. However, there was an additional matter requiring my time and attention, that I’d like to let my clients and readers know about, now that that work is almost completed.

That additional matter is the redesign and reorganization of my present one website (click on the “Website” tab above if you haven’t visited there yet,) into a stand-alone website dedicated entirely to Massachusetts criminal law (presently, the site includes both criminal law and personal injury.) The new website will have all the same valuable information as the present one, with added features and a lot more valuable content that can assist you with a wide variety of questions about Massachusetts criminal law.

The new web site should be up and live on the internet by Wednesday, January 18 at the latest, so please, check it out and call me if my firm can be of help to you!

Most people who were asked what “Double Jeopardy” is, would think it has something to do with the TV game show. Not exactly. OK – to be fair, you’d probably need to have taken at least one college-level course in criminal justice or pre-law, to understand the answer.

What the answer has to do with, is the U.S. Constitution‘s prohibition on a person being tried twice or punished twice for the same crime. This clause in the Constitution is known as the “Double Jeopardy Clause,” which is found in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. In other words, you can’t be charged with a crime, acquitted or convicted, then tried again for the exact same crime. The framers of our Constitution intended for this protection, against potentially overzealous government prosecutors.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) released a decision yesterday, clarifying this principle. In case you think that cases like this always involve murder or such, they don’t. In this case, the crime involved possession of an unlicensed gun; importantly, not use of the gun, just possession of it. Not exactly shoplifting, but not the worst crime under the sun, either – not compared to what I’ve seen, as a Dedham, Massachusetts criminal defense lawyer. In the case the SJC reviewed, a man had been arrested for illegal possession of a firearm, a Massachusetts gun & firearms offense. The police charged him with both illegal possession of a loaded gun, and illegal possession of ammunition – even though the only bullets he was in possession of were in the gun itself. He wasn’t, for example, carrying an extra supply of bullets. Prosecutors had argued that since more than one bullet was found in the gun, a jury could “reasonably” conclude that some of the bullets could satisfy the charge of carrying an unlicensed, loaded gun and the other bullets could be “used” to reach the additional ammunition charge.

Quick question: If you’re in a Massachusetts motor vehicle accident with an off-duty police officer, and he or she prevents you from either driving away or leaving the scene of the accident until the appropriate police department arrives, is that an “arrest” for legal purposes? According to the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), the answer is “No”, and as a result, any evidence obtained by the police who have geographic jurisdiction and are summoned to the scene by the off-duty officer, cannot be excluded at trial.

Let’s start with basics in this area of Massachusetts criminal law, then we’ll get to the facts of this case: At common law in Massachusetts, a police officer cannot generally make a warrantless arrest outside of his territorial jurisdiction. If, for an example, an off-duty Boston police officer made a warrantless arrest of a person in Westwood, that would probably be ruled to be an invalid arrest, and as a result, any evidence that the Boston police officer obtained as a result of that “arrest” would be deemed inadmissible at trial against the person arrested.

In this case, a driver’s automobile collided in Woburn with a vehicle driven by an off-duty Somerville police officer. That off-duty Somerville officer suspected that the driver who hit him was operating under the influence of alcohol in Massachusetts, and the officer prevented the driver from leaving the scene until the Woburn police arrived. Upon arrival, the Woburn police arrested the driver for Massachusetts OUI/DUI, and the driver was later indicted for operating while under the influence of alcohol and for operating with a suspended license and operating with a revoked license. This defendant’s attorney did what as a Dedham, Massachusetts OUI lawyer I would have done in similar circumstances: Filed what is called a ‘Motion to Suppress’, arguing that any evidence that was obtained by the Woburn police, should be excluded at trial in the prosecution’s case against the defendant.

Most Massachusetts drug offense prosecutions involve challenges to how police obtained the illegal drugs that a defendant is charged with possessing. As a Dedham, Massachusetts drug crimes lawyer, I try to prevent this evidence from being admitted at trial, through what are called pre-trial “Motions to Suppress.” The legal bases of these challenges typically revolve around the validity of searches, whether search warrants that might have been issued were valid, whether police had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search, and a variety of other legal reasons.

One method for a police search for illegal drugs was recently challenged in federal court in Boston, with an interesting outcome.

A suspect was arrested for operating a motor vehicle without a license, a Massachusetts motor vehicle violation. However, he police officer who stopped the suspect quickly came to suspect that more than just a traffic violation was taking place. The officer was told by a confidential informant whom the officer knew well and trusted, that suspect had inserted a package of crack cocaine into his rectum just prior to his being arrested. Because the arresting officer trusted the confidential informant due to the informant’s supposedly having produced reliable information for a considerable period of time previously, the officer asked the suspect to submit to a rectal examination for evidence of concealed drugs. The suspect refused. No surprise there.

This isn’t exactly breaking news, but it’s something worth reminding my readers of. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) recently handed down a ruling on a challenge to the state imposing a fee to get a hearing on a motor vehicle offense or traffic violation.

Drivers seeking to appeal a citation in front of a Clerk-Magistrate have been charged a $25.00 fee since July 1, 2009. If the hearing results in an adverse finding and the driver wishes to appeal the Clerk’s finding to a District Court judge, there is an additional $50.00 fine. Prior to July 1 2009, drivers could secure a hearing before a Clerk-Magistrate for free, and appeals to a judge after a Clerk’s hearing cost only a $20 fee. The state imposed the new fees as part of a sweeping set of new “revenue-enhancement” measures in 2009. (Translation: New taxes.) A lawyer challenged the new hearing fees, arguing that the fees violated his constitutional right to equal protection. He argued an equal protection violation due to the fact that people who contest traffic violations are treated differently from people contesting other civil infractions, such as tickets for smoking in public places and for possession of an ounce of marijuana or less.

Unfortunately, the SJC ruled that drivers who challenge traffic tickets enjoy “significantly greater” procedural safeguards than people who challenge other civil violations, and hence the court found no equal protection violation. These greater procedural protections include the right to subpoena witnesses, the right to be heard by a Clerk-magistrate, and the right to a new hearing before a judge, if the violator is found against by a clerk-magistrate. Justifying the fee, the SJC wrote that these safeguards impose “greater demands on the resources of the District Court,” that approximately 700,000 drivers are cited each year for civil vehicular traffic violations, that approximately 200,000 of those drivers seek hearings, and that those increased administrative demands justify the fees.

Here’s an interesting point: Most people would be able to tell you that if you are questioned by police in a police station or in an environment where your ability to leave is otherwise restricted, police must read you your Miranda Rights. This type of questioning is referred to legally as “custodial interrogation.” Miranda Rights, as anyone with a television set knows, are the rights that persons are afforded by the United States Constitution, whenever a person is the subject of custodial interrogation. These rights were first created by a famous U.S. Supreme Court case, Miranda v. Arizona.

But what if a person is questioned in his home by police? Is he entitled to be provided his Miranda Rights in that setting? A federal Appeals Court recently took a look at that, and had an interesting answer. It all started when a U.S. naval officer living in Maine, claimed that when he was questioned by police in his home as part of a crime investigation, he was effectively “in custody”, and that because police did not provide him his Miranda Rights, any statements that he made to them as part of that questioning should be inadmissible in court.

Do you think most people would agree? Well, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit did.

A California trucking company, Inland Empire, hired two men to drive a tractor-trailer to Boston, a trip that driver Miguel Aguilar made at least 10 times in the past year. Last week Aguilar made the trip with novice driver Jose Cubias.

State police, working on a Massachusetts drug crimes investigation, pulled over the purple Volvo 18-wheeler with California plates. According to prosecutors, police asked the men a few questions. The suspects replied that they were California residents who were employed in that state, and they consented to a search of the vehicle. That’s when police found 66 pounds of cocaine and $570,000 in cash inside the vehicle.

Aguilar and Cubias were charged in Chelsea District Court on charges of Massachusetts drug trafficking and conspiracy to violate Massachusetts state drug laws. They were each held on $950,000 cash bail, and both men pleaded not guilty.

This blog isn’t entirely about criminal defendants’ legal rights. It’s about promoting awareness of safety in an unsafe world.

This became all too clear just a couple of days ago, when a 14 year-old girl in Lynn was almost the victim of a Massachusetts kidnapping, after an attempted abduction by a stranger in Lynn. Just a few steps away from Lynn Classical High School, the girl was by an assailant described as a teenage black male with a Haitian accent. Thankfully, the girl was able to break free from the abductor, who escaped. The girl told police that the suspect has yellow dots in his eyes, and a scar on his nose. She said he tried to drag her into a bright red , 4-dorr car with a rear seat that had yellow dots on it.

The mere thought of this happening to a young child is frightening and disturbing. And even though the principal of Lynn Classical High School told police that this is the first time in his 30 years being principal that an attempted abduction of a student had taken place, this incident should remind parents and students everywhere that safety and self-awareness should always be priorities whenever walking alone. Had this suspect been able to abduct this youth, the crime of kidnapping would be charged. If he is apprehended, he will be charged with, among other crimes, attempted kidnapping. As a Boston Massachusetts criminal defense lawyer, I can assure readers that safety should always be priority one.

Contact Information